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A MATTER OF FAIRNESS:
THE NEED FOR A NEW LOOK AT
SELECTIVE WAIVER IN SEC
INVESTIGATIONS
MICHAEL H. DORE*
As it has made abundantly clear, the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") values "cooperation" in its investigations of potential
violations of the federal securities laws.' At the same time, the SEC looks
very unfavorably on a perceived lack of cooperation, threatening targets of
investigations with penalties and more serious charges.2 "Cooperation" may
include the decision not to assert attorney-client privilege and work-product
protection for various materials that are then produced to the SEC. But when
a corporation produces materials to the SEC that otherwise would be
protected by the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine, does it
waive those protections as to everyone else, including civil litigants? Right
now, the answer depends on what court you are in. Going forward, however,
this Article argues that courts can and should rely on notions of fairness and
congressional intent to find only the most limited waiver.
A few courts, principally the Eighth Circuit, 3 have recognized "selective
waiver," under which the corporation waives the attorney-client privilege
and/or work-product protection only in relation to the government agency that
received the otherwise protected materials. Most other courts-including the
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits-have rejected
selective waiver, holding that waiver as to one generally is waiver as to all.4
* Michael H. Dore is an associate in the Los Angeles office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP.
The opinions expressed herein are the personal views of the author alone. Thanks to the Staff'ofthe
Marquette Law Review, Daniel S. Floyd, Tara S. Kole, and Michael P. Dore for their invaluable
insights and suggestions.
1. See Report of Investigation and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation
to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44969, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Release No. 1470 (Oct. 23, 2001), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-
44969.htm [hereinafter Seaboard Report].
2. See, e.g., Lucent Settles SEC Enforcement Action Charging the Company with $1.1 Billion
Accounting Fraud, Exchange Act Release No. 2004-67 (May 17, 2004) ("As part of the settlement,
Lucent agreed to pay a $25 million penalty for its lack of cooperation.").
3. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
4. See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 307
(6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 686-87 (1st Cir. 1997); Permian
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But even these courts disagree about whether a confidentiality agreement
between the producing party and the government agency is effective to
maintain the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection.5 Thus,
corporations and their attorneys face a great deal of uncertainty in determining
the extent to which the attorney-client and work-product protections apply
after disclosure to the SEC, and it is extremely difficult to predict how
undecided courts, like the Ninth Circuit, will resolve the issue.
6
Without question, the trend at the circuit level is to reject selective waiver.
The Eighth Circuit case that endorsed selective waiver, Diversified Industries,
Inc. v. Meredith,7 is now an outlier, continually rejected by other circuits
since it was decided. But Diversified recognized selective waiver for one
reason and one reason only: "To hold otherwise would have the effect of
thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to employ independent
outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect
stockholders, potential stockholders, and customers." 8  Courts that have
rejected Diversified, and thus rejected presumptive selective waiver, generally
have focused only on the Eighth Circuit's rationale that cooperation with the
government should be encouraged. 9  But there are different and more
compelling reasons for selective waiver that have gone largely, if not entirely,
unaddressed by the courts.
First, selective waiver does much more than merely encourage disclosure
to government agencies. In fact, it guarantees fairness. Several courts that
have rejected selective waiver have cited the perceived unfairness of allowing
a party to manipulate the application of the privilege in a self-serving manner,
arguing that the attorney-client privilege "is not designed for such tactical
Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
5. Compare In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Establishing a
rigid rule would fail to anticipate situations . . . in which the SEC and the disclosing party have
entered into an explicit agreement that the SEC will maintain the confidentiality of the disclosed
materials."), with In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 302 ("[A]ny form of selective waiver, even that which
stems from a confidentiality agreement, transforms the attorney-client privilege into merely another
brush on an attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or strategic advantage.")
(quotations omitted).
6. United States v. Bergonzi, 403 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Whether the sort of
selective waiver McKesson seeks is available in this Circuit is an open question.").
7. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
8. Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611; see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the
Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The Eighth Circuit's sole justification for
permitting selective waiver was to encourage corporations to undertake internal investigations.").
9. See, e.g., Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 685 ("The primary argument in favor of the Eighth
Circuit position is that loss of the privilege may discourage the frank exchange between attorney and
client in future cases, wherever the client anticipates making a disclosure to at least one government
agency.").
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employment."1 ° But the SEC takes just such a strategic approach to privilege
when it forces corporations to choose between the Commission's wrath and
wholesale disclosure to suing shareholders. In effect, the Commission has
instituted a policy that does everything but force parties to produce privileged
materials to the Commission. This self-serving approach to privilege is a
prerequisite for its perceived tactical use by corporations, and the effect is to
create a disincentive for clients to confide in their attorneys. Moreover, the
scope of the waiver is rarely addressed by courts, so corporations have no idea
just how much they are sacrificing by "cooperating" with government
agencies.
Second, beyond simply being unfair, total waiver also conflicts with
Congress's intent in creating the discovery stay contained in the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA")." One purpose of the
PSLRA discovery stay, described in the legislative history, is to prevent
"fishing-expedition" lawsuits by plaintiffs hoping to use discovery to bolster
their case. 12 If the privilege is waived by production to the SEC, plaintiffs
have all the more reason to sue, since they may improperly piggyback on a
government investigation to obtain information that otherwise would remain
confidential. This problem is magnified by some recent decisions (district
courts are divided) saying that the discovery stay should be lifted for relevant
documents produced to the government. 3 This threatens to streamline the
delivery of otherwise protected documents to civil plaintiffs, and gives them
even greater incentive to sue. The PSLRA was designed to prevent such a
situation. 14
Part I of this Article provides general descriptions of the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine and describes the background of the
SEC's approach to cooperation in its investigations of possible federal
securities law violations. Part II describes the state of the law regarding
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection by virtue
10. See, e.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000).
12. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 693; H.R.
REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 748.
13. See, e.g., Singer v. Nicor, Inc., No. 02-C-5168, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26189, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 24, 2003).
14. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 693; see also
Faulkner v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 384, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("History has
proven that plaintiffs sometimes file lawsuits in order to conduct discovery in the hopes of finding a
sustainable claim not alleged in the complaint. The PSLRA was therefore designed to deter the
abusive practices committed in private securities litigation which includes the routine filing of
lawsuits ... with only faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible
cause of action.") (citations and quotations omitted).
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of disclosure to government agencies like the SEC. Finally, Part III argues in
favor of selective waiver, based on notions of fairness and the consequences
of waiver that clearly conflict with an underlying purpose of the PSLRA.
I. WAIVING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT
PROTECTION TO COOPERATE WITH THE SEC
A. Background of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product
Doctrine
The attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine serve different
purposes. The attorney-client privilege is meant to "encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice." 5 One comprehensive definition of the privilege states the following:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. 16
The privilege, which applies to corporations,' 7 typically is waived "by
voluntary disclosure of private communications by an individual or
corporation to third parties.'"
18
The work-product doctrine protects "the confidentiality of papers prepared
by or on behalf of attorneys in anticipation of litigation."' 9  Unlike the
attorney-client privilege, "a disclosure to a third party does not necessarily
waive the protection of the work-product doctrine', 20 Rather, "[m]ost courts
hold that to waive the protection of the work-product doctrine, the disclosure
15. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
16. United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1461 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292 (John T. McNaughton rev. 1961)).
17. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389-90.
18. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir.
2002).
19. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir.
1991).
20. Id.
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must enable an adversary to gain access to the information.",2' Accordingly,
courts generally recognize that the work-product doctrine is "broader than the
attorney-client privilege. 22
B. The SEC's Policy on Cooperation
1. The SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program
As noted above, in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, the Eighth
Circuit expressed its view that selective waiver should be used to encourage
"the developing procedure of corporations to employ independent outside
counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect stockholders,
potential stockholders, and customers. 23  This "procedure," however, was
developed under unique circumstances in the mid-1970s and has limited
application to today's SEC investigations. Thus, the reasons for selective
waiver extend far beyond anything discussed in Diversified and rejected by
other courts.
Diversified involved the SEC's "Voluntary Disclosure Program," which
was implemented to address the "political 'slush fund' practices" of some
corporations.24 According to one court describing the program, "[i]nitially the
SEC staff carried out its own investigations, but as the scope of the payments
problem became apparent, extending to foreign as well as domestic payments,
the SEC realized that it did not have the resources to investigate each case
carefully. 25 Accordingly:
In several 1974 enforcement actions, the SEC thus sought and
obtained consent decrees in which corporate defendants
agreed to appoint special committees of their boards of
directors--composed entirely of directors unaffiliated with
management-to carry out independent investigations of the
defendants' payments practices. These investigations were to
be performed by outside counsel hired for that purpose and
21. Id.
22. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 304 (quotations omitted). But cf Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
951 F.2d at 1429 ("[T]he standard for waiving the work-product doctrine should be no more stringent
than the standard for waiving the attorney-client privilege.").
23. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
24. See id. at 607-08, 611; see generally Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1426 n. 12
(describing Voluntary Disclosure Program); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 800-01 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (same).
25. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 800.
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responsible only to the special committee. The results of the
investigation would be embodied in a report to the special
committee, which would also be shared with the SEC staff 16
The SEC recognized the benefits of this approach, and thus "began to
encourage corporations to come forward voluntarily and perform the same
type of independent investigation that the consent decrees had required."
27
"In return... the SEC offered leniency for past abuses and a chance to avoid
extended formal investigation and litigation." 28 As the D.C. Circuit noted in
In re Sealed Case, "This effort to induce corporate self-investigation became
known as the voluntary disclosure program.,
29
The SEC publicized its program in congressional hearings and at various
conferences, and SEC Chairman Roderick Hills made clear that cooperation
entailed four major steps.30 In In re Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit described
these steps, citing congressional testimony by Chairman Hills, which stated
the following:
First, a corporation's board of directors should declare an
end to all payments of doubtful legality and practices
involving maintenance of inaccurate books and records;
Second, the board should authorize a special committee
composed primarily of independent directors to perform a
thorough investigation of the corporation's practices, using
independent counsel and auditors to prepare a report to a full
board;
Third, information on the commencement and progress of
the investigation should be lodged with the SEC on its Form
8-K, and a copy of the final report should be filed with the
SEC; and
Fourth, "ilt must be understood that the staff of the
Commission will have access to any information that is
discovered or developed during the investigation.
31
26. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 819 n. 104 ("Ultimately, the information discovered in
these investigations was to be turned over to the stockholders of the participating companies and to
the investing public.").
27. Id.; see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1426 n.12 (describing Voluntary
Disclosure Program).
28. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 801.
29. Id. at 800.
30. Id. at 801 & n.13.
31. Id. at 801 & n. 15 (quoting Abuses of Corporate Power: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
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This fourth step demonstrated that the internal investigations were
initiated without the slightest pretense of confidentiality. In fact, at the same
1976 congressional hearings in which Chairman Hills described the contours
of the Voluntary Disclosure Program, the director of the SEC's Enforcement
Division added that "It]he thing that the program has as a key part is that...
when the final report comes in, we will have access to both the report and the
underlying data.",
32
Most courts to address selective waiver have done so in the context of this
Voluntary Disclosure Program.33 But cooperation with the SEC today is
guided by a more recent policy, which even the SEC considers to be distinct
from the voluntary disclosure initiative that it implemented in the 1970s.
2. The 2001 "Seaboard Report"
In its October 23, 2001 Seaboard Report,34 the SEC articulated a policy
whereby it would grant leniency for cooperation with SEC investigations.35
The report's immediate purpose was to explain why the Commission was not
taking action against the Seaboard Corporation ("Seaboard") for its "apparent
misconduct.,
36
The SEC had found that the controller of Seaboard's Miami-based
division booked, and later tried to conceal, improper entries in the division's
books and records that overstated assets and understated expenses.37
Seaboard became aware of this wrongdoing and, within a week, "the
company's internal auditors had conducted a preliminary review and had
advised company management who, in turn, advised the Board's audit
committee, that [the controller] had caused the company's books and records
on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 9-10 (1976) (testimony of Rod Hills, Chairman, SEC) (emphasis added)).
32. Id. (quoting Abuses of Corporate Power: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Priorities and
Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong. 23 (1976) (testimony of Stanley
Sporkin, Director, SEC Enforcement Division)).
33. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 295 n.7
(6th Cir. 2002) (describing Voluntary Disclosure Program and noting that "[it is against this
background that many of the reported cases discussed herein arose"); see also, e.g., Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1426, n.12 (3d. Cir. 1991); In re Sealed
Case, 676 F.2d at 800-01; Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 607-08 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
34. Seaboard Report, supra note 1.
35. Id. at 1.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also In re Gisela de Leon-Meredith, Exchange Act Release No. 44970, Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1471 (Oct. 23, 2001).
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to be inaccurate and its financial reports to be misstated."38 The full Board,
having been advised of what happened, authorized the company to hire an
outside law firm to conduct an inquiry, the details of which were produced to
the SEC. 39  Throughout this process, the company "did not invoke the
attorney-client privilege, work-product protection or other privileges or
protections with respect to any facts uncovered in the investigation., 40 Based
on Seaboard's cooperation, the SEC chose not to seek any penalties against
41the company.
In absolving Seaboard, the Report noted more generally that "[w]hen
businesses seek out, self-report and rectify illegal conduct, and otherwise
cooperate with Commission staff, large expenditures of government and
shareholder resources can be avoided and investors can benefit more
promptly. 42 Accordingly, the Commission
set forth . . . some of the criteria [it] will consider in
determining whether, and how much, to credit self-policing,
self-reporting, remediation and cooperation-from the
extraordinary step of taking no enforcement action to
bringing reduced charges, seeking lighter sanctions, or
including mitigating language in documents [it] use[s] to
announce and resolve enforcement actions. 3
The list of criteria relate to a company's internal investigation of alleged
wrongdoing. Among the inquiries listed in the Report are the following:
Did the company commit to learn the truth, fully and
expeditiously?
Did it do a thorough review of the nature, extent, origins
and consequences of the conduct and related behavior?
Did management, the Board or committees consisting
solely of outside directors oversee the review?
Did the company promptly make available to our staff the
results of its review and provide sufficient documentation
38. Seaboard Report, supra note 1, at 1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id. at 5. These criteria were not meant to be an exhaustive list. Id. at 4-5 ("[W]e do not
limit ourselves to the criteria we discuss below.").
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reflecting its response to the situation?
Did the company produce a thorough and probing written
report detailing the findings of its review?
Did the company voluntarily disclose information our
staff did not directly request and otherwise might not have
uncovered?
44
In a footnote, the Report added a more detailed discussion of this
"voluntary disclosure" inquiry, noting that "[i]n some cases, the desire to
provide information to the Commission staff may cause companies to
consider choosing not to assert the attorney-client privilege, the work-product
protection and other privileges, protections and exemptions with respect to the
Commission., 45 The Commission then professed to "recognize[] that these
privileges, protections and exemptions serve important social interests," and
thus "the Commission does not view a company's waiver of a privilege as an
end in itself, but only as a means (where necessary) to provide relevant and
sometimes critical information to the Commission staff.",
46
3. Why Selective Waiver in the Context of the Voluntary Disclosure Program
Should Be Viewed Differently from Disclosure After the Seaboard Report
On its face, the Seaboard Report seems very similar to the Voluntary
Disclosure Program. In both situations, companies are encouraged to use
outside directors and counsel to conduct investigations of wrongdoing. And
in both situations, the SEC offers inducements to waive the attorney-client
and work-product protections and to produce the results of those internal
investigations to the Commission. But in practice they are very different.
The Seaboard Report now is used as a template to induce cooperation
even outside the context of internal investigations to be made public. That is,
the SEC asks for documents protected by the attorney-client and work-product
protections that the Company never otherwise contemplated giving to the
SEC.47 This is in sharp contrast to the Voluntary Disclosure Program, under
44. Id. at 7-8.
45. Id. at 8 n.3.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., In the Matter of Monsanto Co., Exchange Act Release No. 50978 (Jan. 6, 2005)
(recognizing cooperation by Monsanto that included "declining to assert its attorney-client privilege
with respect to communications during the relevant time period"); In the Matter of BJ Servs. Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 49390 (Mar. 10, 2004); cf Memorandum from United States Deputy
Attorney Gen. Larry D. Thompson to Heads of Dep't Components (Jan. 20, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cfff/corporateguidelines.htm (including "waiver of corporate attorney-
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which work-product was created for the express purpose of production to the
Commission.48
Another difference is that under the Seaboard regime, a perceived lack of
cooperation itself can result in serious penalties. Under the Voluntary
Disclosure Program, the lack of an internal investigation could result in an
SEC investigation and charges for wrongdoing, but the lack of a "voluntary"
internal investigation itself was not something to be penalized. Today,
though, just as "cooperation" can bring leniency from the SEC, a perceived
lack of cooperation can result in severe penalties.49
Thus, under the Voluntary Disclosure Program in the 1970s and 1980s,
companies effectively acted as investigatory arms of the government. This
arrangement was the product of the government's lack of sufficient resources,
and such investigations were undertaken with the understanding that any
findings would be produced to the SEC. Now, however, cooperation
generally becomes an issue at a later stage. The Seaboard Report itself arose
from circumstances preceding an SEC-initiated investigation, but in practice
the government generally seeks cooperation with its investigation, not in place
of it.50 Such cooperation may include the production of privileged materials
client and work-product protection" as a factor to be considered in determining whether a federal
prosecutor should charge a corporation, and noting that this waiver applies "both with respect to its
internal investigation and with respect to communications between specific officers, directors and
employees and counsel").
48. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 818-19 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("As the many cases
concerning companies that participated in the [voluntary disclosure] program attest, the program
involved a unique use of private lawyers and the adversary system to accommodate the joint needs of
government and the private sector.").
49. See Securities & Exchange Commission Press Release 2006-4 Concerning Financial
Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm ("The degree to which a
corporation has self reported an offense, or otherwise cooperated with the investigation and
remediation of the offense, is a factor that the Commission will consider in determining the propriety
of a corporate penalty."); see, e.g., Lucent Settles SEC Enforcement Action Charging the Company
with $1.1 Billion Accounting Fraud, Exchange Act Release No. 2004-67 (May 17, 2004) ("As part of
the settlement, Lucent agreed to pay a $25 million penalty for its lack of cooperation."); In the Matter
of Am. Int'l Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48477 (Sept. 11, 2003) (imposing $10 million
fine on AIG for failing to turn over documents pursuant to subpoenas and "voluntary requests"); see
generally Russell G. Ryan, Wash. Legal Found., Cooperation in SEC Enforcement: The Carrot
Becomes the Stick, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER Vol. 19, No. 33 (Oct. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.wlf.orgluploud/100104LBRYAN.pdf (noting recent penalties for lack of cooperation,
and that "although the SEC has not explicitly stated, in practice such cooperation typically is
expected to include sharing some degree of investigative work-product with the SEC and bearing the
associate risk that such disclosure will later be deemed a broad waiver of applicable privileges").
50. In a recent amicus brief, the SEC argued that "[p]roduction of work-product materials to a
government agency under a confidentiality agreement should not result in waiver of work-product
protection because preserving work-product protection in such circumstances is in the public interest
and is consistent with the policies underpinning the work-product doctrine." Brief for the Securities
and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, United States v. Bergonzi, 403
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created long before the prospect of government action arose.
While a company that refused to take part in the Voluntary Disclosure
Program risked losing only the potential benefits of cooperation, today a
perceived lack of cooperation can result in millions of dollars in penalties.
The SEC has not penalized a company solely for its refusal to waive the
attorney-client privilege and/or work-product protection. Nevertheless, the
Commission's focus on "cooperation" unquestionably creates an incentive for
a company to waive those protections. Thus, there is an entirely different
dynamic from what was described in Diversified. Limited waiver now is
necessary to do more than encourage cooperation with the government. 5 1 It is
needed as a matter of fairness to companies that feel pressure to cooperate but
have no way to calculate the repercussions of agreeing or refusing to do so.
II. THE VARIED APPROACHES TAKEN BY FEDERAL COURTS REGARDING
WAIVER
In rejecting selective waiver, the D.C. Circuit noted in In re Sealed Case
that "[w]hen a corporation elects to participate in a voluntary disclosure
program like the SEC's, it necessarily decides that the benefits of participation
outweigh the benefits of confidentiality for all files necessary to a full
evaluation of its disclosures. 52 In re Sealed Case again involved the SEC's
Voluntary Disclosure Program and thus was distinct from the situation in
which a company must decide whether to cooperate with an ongoing SEC
investigation by waiving privilege. But the court's statement reflects a key
F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-10511) [hereinafter Brief for the Securities and Exchange
Commission]. The Commission took no position on the applicability of the attorney-client privilege
to the documents at issue, id. at 4 n.3, but it did distinguish the Voluntary Disclosure Program from
the issues presented in that case. Id. (distinguishing Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the
Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir. 1991), because "the reports at issue in Westinghouse had
been produced under a Voluntary Discovery Program," and such reports "were usually created in lieu
of, not in furtherance of, a Commission investigation").
51. In fact, the government's threats to companies that do not cooperate lead to cooperation
even where it results in total waiver. See In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir.
1993):
The SEC's amicus brief argues convincingly that the protection of privilege is
not required to encourage compliance with SEC requests for cooperation with
investigations. The SEC has continued to receive voluntary cooperation from
subjects of investigations, notwithstanding the rejection of the selective waiver
doctrine by two circuits and public statements from Directors of the
Enforcement Division that the SEC considers voluntary disclosures to be
discoverable and admissible.
Id. (citation omitted).
52. 676 F.2d 793, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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fallacy used to reject limited waiver. That is, the notion that a company has
any ability to quantify the risks and benefits of cooperation. Right now, the
case law addressing selective waiver is "in a state of hopeless confusion.,
53
And very few courts have addressed the issue of the waiver's scope. Quite
simply, there is no transparent choice. Companies that cooperate arguably are
meeting only the immediate threat of government action, not making a
calculated decision between known alternatives.
A. Decisions Regarding the Existence of Selective Waiver
Courts have taken three general positions regarding the existence of
waiver due to cooperation with the government: (1) selective waiver is
permissible; (2) selective waiver is not permissible under any circumstances;
and (3) selective waiver is permissible where the government enters into a
confidentiality agreement with the producing party.54  Determining where
courts stand is complicated, however, by the subtle distinction between waiver
of the attorney-client privilege and waiver of the work-product doctrine (i.e.,
work-product protection is waived only by disclosure to an "adversary").
Even the Sixth Circuit, in its comprehensive analysis of selective waiver case
law, confused the holdings of various cases, incorrectly attributing to them a
holding regarding waiver of attorney-client privilege when a different
privilege or protection was at issue.55 Nevertheless, this distinction appears to
be relevant mainly to the third category of cases noted above.
Of the federal courts of appeals to address the selective waiver issue, only
the Eighth Circuit has adopted selective waiver. The First, Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have rejected the Eight Circuit's
approach, and in doing so have rejected outright selective waiver of the
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection, or else allowed it only
as to work-product protection when there is a confidentiality agreement.
53. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 295 (6th Cir.
2002) (quotations omitted).
54. See generally id. at 295-302 (describing these three views and reviewing cases following
them).
55. See id. at 300-01 (discussing In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993) in
the context of attorney-client privilege when that decision solely related to the work-product
doctrine); see also In re Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236 ("Steinhardt's voluntary submission of the
memorandum to the Enforcement Division waived the protections of the work-product doctrine as to
subsequent civil litigants seeking the memorandum from Steinhardt.").
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1. Selective Waiver Is Permissible
The Eighth Circuit was the first court to recognize selective waiver,
though the court addressed only waiver of the attorney-client privilege and not
work-product protection.56 In Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, The
Weatherhead Company sought an internal report prepared by outside counsel
for Diversified's independent audit committee. 57 Diversified had formed the
committee when it became apparent that the company was paying bribes to
obtain business, and the resulting report was produced to the SEC pursuant to
a subpoena.58 The Eighth Circuit recognized the benefits of the nascent
Voluntary Disclosure Program, holding that production to the SEC resulted in
"only a limited waiver of the [attorney-client] privilege." 59 According to the
court, "to hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing
procedure of corporations to employ independent outside counsel to
investigate and advise them in order to protect stockholders, potential
stockholders and customers. 6°
After Diversified, "several district courts held that disclosures to
government agencies (typically the SEC in a voluntary disclosure program
situation) do not waive the protections of the attorney-client privilege. 61
Notwithstanding these isolated district court opinions, however, courts
generally have rejected the Eighth Circuit's decision.
2. Selective Waiver Is Not Permissible
Federal courts of appeals that have addressed selective waiver generally
have viewed the rationale of Diversified and the reasons for selective waiver
to be synonymous, and Diversified to have been wrongly decided.
56. See In re Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 235 ("The en banc opinion in Diversified addressed [the
selective waiver] question in the context of the attorney-client privilege, rather than in the context of
the work-product doctrine.").
57. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 607-08 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
58. See id. at 607-08, 611.
59. Id. at 611. But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 841 F.2d 230, 234 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating
that "[v]oluntary disclosure is inconsistent with the confidential attorney-client relationship and
waives the privilege," and citing Diversified as contrary authority with a "but cf" signal).
60. Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611; see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the
Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The Eighth Circuit's sole justification for
permitting selective waiver was to encourage corporations to undertake internal investigations.").
61. In re Colurnbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 299 (6th Cir.
2002); see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 373 (D. Wis.
1979) (rejecting waiver because "I believe that such cooperation [with the SEC] should be
encouraged").
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In Permian Corp. v. United States, for example, the D.C. Circuit found the
"'limited waiver' theory wholly unpersuasive." 62 According to the court:
The Eighth Circuit's "limited waiver" rule has little to do
with [the] confidential link between the client and his legal
advisor. Voluntary cooperation with government
investigations may be a laudable activity, but it is hard to
understand how such conduct improves the attorney-client
relationship. If the client feels the need to keep his
communications with his attorney confidential, he is free to
do so under the traditional rule by consistently asserting the
privilege, even when the discovery request comes from a
"friendly" agency.
63
Permian's review of selective waiver "was limited to... discussion of the
attorney-client privilege, '' 64 though cases also addressing the work-product
doctrine have largely echoed its analysis.65
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines,66 for
example, the Third Circuit rejected selective waiver in relation to both the
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection.67 According to the
court, the "Eighth Circuit's sole justification for permitting selective waiver
was to encourage corporations to undertake internal investigations." 68 Thus,
"selective waiver does not serve the purpose of encouraging full disclosure to
one's attorney in order to obtain informed legal assistance; it merely
encourages voluntary disclosure to government agencies, thereby extending
the [attorney-client] privilege beyond its intended purpose. '69  The
62. 665 F.2d 1214, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
63. Id. at 1220-21.
64. In re Steinhardt, 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993).
65. See id. at 235 ("[M]uch of the reasoning in Diversified has equal, if not greater,
applicability in the context of work-product doctrine."); see also Burden-Meeks v. Welch, 319 F.3d
897, 899 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Knowing disclosure to a third party almost invariably surrenders the
privilege with respect to the world at large; selective disclosure is not an option."); United States v.
Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 686 (1st Cir. 1997) (rejecting selective waiver because "[a]nyone
who chooses to disclose a privileged document to a third party, or does so pursuant to a prior
agreement or understanding, has an incentive to do so, whether for gain or to avoid disadvantage");
In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Thus, Martin Marietta has impliedly
waived the work-product privilege as to all non-opinion work-product on the same subject matter as
that disclosed.").
66. 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991).
67. See id. at 1423-30.
68. Id. at 1425.
69. Id.
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Westinghouse court further held that such disclosures "waived the protection
of the work-product doctrine because they were not made to further the goal
underlying the doctrine." 70  The court thus entirely rejected the notion of
selective waiver, and while the issue was not squarely presented in that case,
it further noted that the existence of a confidentiality agreement would not
have changed its analysis.
7
'
More recently, the Sixth Circuit noted in In re Columbia!HCA Healthcare
Corp. Billing Practices Litigation72 that "[t]he selective waiver doctrine stems
from the Diversified opinion." 73 According to the court, however, selective
waiver does not serve the purpose of the attorney-client privilege because,
"[a]s pointed out by the Third Circuit in Westinghouse, the Diversified
approach 'merely encourages voluntary disclosure to government
agencies.' ' 74 And "[o]ther than the fact that the initial waiver must be to an
adversary, there is no compelling reason for differentiating waiver of work-
product from waiver of attorney-client privilege. 75  The existence of a
confidentiality agreement did not change the court's view because the
attorney-client privilege "is not a creature of contract, arranged between the
parties to suit the whim of the moment," 76 nor did the court feel there was
reason to transform the work-product doctrine into "a sword rather than a
shield.",
77
3. Selective Waiver When There Is A Confidentiality Agreement
i. Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege
A few federal district courts have held that a confidentiality agreement
preserves the attorney-client privilege as to third parties when a company
produces documents to the government. This approach "has its roots in
70. Id. at 1429.
71. Id. at 1430 ("Even if we had found that the agencies had made such an agreement [to keep
produced documents confidential], it would not change our conclusion.") (internal citations omitted).
As to the work-product protection, the court held that "had the DOJ and the SEC not been
Westinghouse's adversaries, and had we concluded that Westinghouse reasonably expected the
agencies to keep the material that it disclosed to them confidential, we might reach a different result."
Id. at 1431.
72. 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
73. Id. at 298.
74. Id. at 302 (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414,
1425 (3d Cir. 1991)).
75. Id. at 306 (quotations and footnotes omitted).
76. Id. at 303.
77. Id. at 307.
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Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n of America v. Shamrock Broadcasting
Co., ' ' 78 which "[a]s with many other cases on this subject ... involved the
investigation, during the 1970s, of alleged improper dealings by a
corporation., 79  In Teachers Insurance, the court was "of the opinion that
disclosure to the SEC should be deemed to be a complete waiver of the
attorney-client privilege unless the right to assert the privilege in subsequent
proceedings is specifically reserved at the time the disclosure is made.
'80
In its comprehensive review of the case law addressing selective waiver in
In re Columbia/Healthcare Corp., the Sixth Circuit suggested that this
approach had greater support than was actually the case. 81 The court
suggested, for example, that In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P. 82 endorsed the use
of a confidentiality agreement to preserve the attorney-client privilege. 83 But
that decision related solely to the work-product doctrine.84
The In re Columbia/Healthcare Corp. court also discussed Dellwood
Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc.,85 in the attorney-client privilege section of its
selective waiver review. 86 Judge Posner's opinion did note that "[i]n the case
of selective disclosure, the courts feel, reasonably enough, that the possessor
of the privileged information should have been more careful, as by obtaining
an agreement by the person to whom they made the disclosure not to spread it
further." 87 But Dellwood Farms involved the "law enforcement investigatory
privilege," not the attorney-client privilege.88 One perhaps may use Judge
Posner's statement to argue for limited waiver of the work-product protection
where there is a confidentiality agreement. But nothing in the Seventh
Circuit's opinion suggests that the court was straying from the principle that
"under traditional waiver doctrine a voluntary disclosure to a third party
waives the attorney-client privilege even if the third party agrees not to
78. 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
79. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 299.
80. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass 'n of Am., 521 F. Supp. at 644-45; see also Fox v. Cal. Sierra
Fin. Servs., 120 F.R.D. 520, 527 (N.D. Cal. 1988) ("I find that where, as here, information has been
voluntarily and selectively disclosed to the SEC without steps to protect the privileged nature of such
information, fairness requires a finding that the attorney-client privilege has been waived as to the
disclosed information and all information on the.same subject.") (citations omitted).
81. See In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 304.
82. 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993).
83. See In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 304 (noting in parenthetical that Steinhardt discussed "the
ability of using an agreement with the SEC to protect work-product and attorney-client privilege").
84. See In re Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 233-36.
85. 128 F.3d 1122 (7th Cir. 1997).
86. See In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 301.
87. Dellwood Farms, 128 F.3d at 1127.
88. Id. at 1125.
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disclose the communications to anyone else."
89
The Sixth Circuit itself recognized that the attorney-client privilege is "not
a creature of contract" and rejected the Teachers Insurance approach. 90
Indeed, it seems intuitive that a confidentiality agreement signed by a third
party cannot negate the fact that the otherwise confidential attorney-client
communication has been disclosed to that third party. Either way, the link
between the attorney and client has been broken, and the privilege waived. 91
ii. Preserving Work-Product Protection
The more difficult issue is the effect of a confidentiality agreement on the
work-product doctrine. As noted above, the Sixth Circuit in In re
Columbia/Healthcare Corp. and the Third Circuit in Westinghouse rejected
selective waiver of the work-product doctrine because they considered
selective waiver to be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the work-
product doctrine. These courts also rejected the argument that a
confidentiality agreement could somehow preserve the work-product
protection that otherwise would be lost.92
In a recent amicus brief filed in the Ninth Circuit, the SEC argued that this
aspect of In re Columbia/Healthcare Corp. was wrongly decided and that the
portion of Westinghouse addressing confidentiality agreements was merely
dicta. 93  The SEC relied heavily on Judge Boggs's dissent in In re
Columbia/Healthcare Corp. to support its contention that a confidentiality
agreement should preserve work-product protection as to third parties.
94
According to the SEC, "[a]llowing parties to produce work-product to the
89. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1427 (3d Cir.
1991) (citing, inter alia, 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2327 (John T. McNaughton rev.
1961)).
90. See In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 303.
91. For attorney-client communications that post-date an SEC confidentiality agreement,
waiver might not even be an issue, since the communications arguably would be made with the
expectation that such information would be produced to the government. As a result, the attorney-
client communication would not be made in confidence, and there would be no privilege to waive.
See In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-99-20743, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7098, at *27
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005) (holding that "the communications were not protected by the attorney-
client privilege when made because McKesson had clearly agreed to disclose attorney-client
communications to third parties before the communications had occurred," and thus that it was
"irrelevant that the government agreed to keep the communications confidential once disclosed
because the attorney-client privilege never attached").
92. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 293, 307 (finding waiver of work-product protection despite
existence of confidentiality agreement); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1430.
93. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 50, at 18.
94. Id.; see generally In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 307-14 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
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Commission without waiving work-product protection serves the public
interest because it significantly enhances the Commission's ability to conduct
expeditious investigations and obtain prompt relief, where appropriate, for
defrauded investors." 95 The SEC also relied heavily on In re Steinhardt, in
which the Second Circuit, purportedly at the SEC's urging, 96 noted the
following:
In denying the petition, we decline to adopt a per se rule that
all voluntary disclosures to the government waive work-
product protection. Crafting rules relating to privilege in
matters of governmental investigations must be done on a
case-by-case basis. Establishing a rigid rule would fail to
anticipate situations in which the disclosing party and the
government may share a common interest in developing legal
theories and analyzing information, or situations in which the
SEC and the disclosing party have entered into an explicit
agreement that the SEC will maintain the confidentiality of
the disclosed materials. 97
But In re Steinhardt did not explain how such an agreement would
preclude the government from being considered an "adversary," which is key
because of the "prevailing rule that disclosure to an adversary, real or
potential, forfeits work-product protection." 98 In fact, in In re Steinhardt, the
court "agree[d] with the district court's conclusion that the SEC stood in an
adversarial position to Steinhardt when it requested assistance." 99
In its amicus brief, the SEC also failed to explain how a confidentiality
agreement would render an investigated party a non-adversary. Instead, the
SEC seemed to credit a confidentiality agreement only as a sort of
Commission seal-of-approval showing the genuineness of a company's desire
to maintain work-product protection:
95. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 50, at 23-24 (citing In re
Columbia, 293 F.3d at 311-13 (Boggs, J., dissenting)).
96. Id.
97. In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); see also
In re Natural Gas Co., No. 03 Civ. 6186 (VM) (AJP), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11950, at *35-39
(S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2005) (following Steinhardt and holding that work-product protection was not
waived in part "because defendants had explicitly written confidentiality and non-waiver agreements
with the governmental agencies").
98. United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 687 (1st Cir. 1997).
99. In re Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 234; see also id. ("The fact that the request came from the SEC's
Enforcement Division further supports the conclusion that this was an adversarial relationship.").
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[T]he Commission emphasizes the use of confidentiality
agreements because confidentiality agreements help prevent
companies from making unnecessary or frivolous claims that
production of work-product did not waive work-product
protection. If a corporation discloses documents without
obtaining a confidentiality agreement from the government,
third-parties should be able to obtain the documents because
the corporation has not provided evidence of an intent to
protect the documents-and has not shown that it was
unwilling to disclose the documents without protection from
third-party plaintiffs. 00
This stance is disingenuous. The public policy and principle on which the
SEC relies arguably should apply to selective waiver generally, but the
Commission opposes this. The SEC's position seems designed only to give
the Commission increased power; it can refuse to enter into a confidentiality
agreement if it deems a company's position "frivolous," and thus put added
pressure on the company to cooperate. Moreover, the SEC likely will not
agree to unconditional confidentiality.1 ' Thus, a company never could be
sure that a court would find the requisite desire to keep the documents
confidential. 102
100. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 50, at 27 (citing In re
Columbia, 293 F.3d at 313 n.3 (Boggs, J., dissenting)).
101. For example, Stephen Cutler, the former Director of the SEC's Enforcement Division,
noted in congressional testimony the SEC's support for proposed legislation to create selective
waiver, but added:
Of course, the Commission must always be free to disclose in an enforcement
proceeding the documents produced to it (even pursuant to a confidentiality
agreement) if the Commission determines that it is necessary in furtherance of
the discharge of its duties and responsibilities. This would be true even if such
use (as distinct from the mere production of documents) resulted in a waiver of
the privilege.
Testimony Concerning the Securities Fraud Deterrence & Investor Restitution Act: Hearing on H.R.
2179 Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored
Enterprises (2003) (statement of Stephen Cutler, SEC Dir., Div. of Enforcement); see, e.g., In re
Syncor ERISA Litig., 229 F.R.D. 636, 646 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding confidentiality agreement under
which SEC could disclose documents as required by law or in furtherance of its discharge of its
duties and responsibilities to be "conditional" and thus "inconsistent with those cases ... allowing
selective waiver").
102. Courts even have attributed varying degrees of significance to the same confidentiality
agreements. For example, where documents were produced to the SEC and U.S. Attorney's office in
relation to government investigations of a merger agreement between McKesson Corporation and
HBO Corporation, some courts found waiver of work-product protection and some courts found no
waiver. Compare United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487, 496 n. 10 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (noting that
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Whatever the Commission's motives, however, the "adversary" problem
seems to undermine its position. Courts generally have held that cooperation
with an investigating agency does not render the relationship between the
investigated company and the agency non-adversarial. 10 3  Consequently, an
agreement between a company and the SEC-especially where the SEC is
investigating that company-does not change their relationship. Regardless
of whether the government intends to share the disclosed materials with other
adversaries, that government agency itself is an adversary. Thus, it seems that
disclosure to the government adversary can result in complete waiver of
work-product protection regardless of whether there is a confidentiality
agreement.
B. Scope of the Waiver
Whether disclosure leads to complete waiver rather than selective waiver
is not the only issue companies must consider. Another major variable, for
"the agreement made by the Government to keep the documents was not unconditional," and that the
court thus "rejects McKesson HBOC's argument that the Agreements protect its privilege"), and
McKesson Corp. v. Green, 610 S.E.2d 54, 57 (Ga. 2005) (affirming decision finding waiver of work-
product protection in part because "McKesson's confidentiality agreement with the SEC was far
from airtight[, since i]t allowed the SEC to give the documents to others if it deemed that course of
action to be 'in furtherance of the [SEC's] discharge of its duties and responsibilities"') (brackets in
original), and McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1239 (Ct. App.
2005) (finding waiver despite confidentiality agreements and noting that "[t]he agreements did not
bind the government to maintain confidentiality under all circumstances"), with In re McKesson
HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-99-20743, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7098, at *48 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31,
2005) (finding no waiver and noting that the confidentiality agreements' "re-disclosure provisions
are logical preconditions for the government's agreeing to treat the materials as privileged and
confidential"), and Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 18553, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, at *40
(Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 2002) ("McKesson HBOC had a reasonable expectation of privacy in its disclosure
of work-product to the SEC under the protection of a confidentiality agreement.").
103. See, e.g., Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 687 ("MIT doubtless hoped that there would be
no actual controversy between it and the Department of Defense, but the potential for dispute and
even litigation was certainly there."); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951
F.2d 1414, 1431 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[H]ad the DOJ and the SEC not been Westinghouse's adversaries.
. .we might reach a different result."); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1988)
("[W]e note that the federal government's and Martin Marietta's interests were decidedly adverse
during the proceedings at issue."); Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. at 496 ("Indeed, the Company and the
Government did not have a true common goal, as it could not have been the Company's goal to
impose liability onto itself, a consideration always maintained by the Government."); Bowne of New
York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[E]ven if the disclosing
party requires, as a condition of disclosure, that the recipient maintain the materials in confidence,
this agreement does not prevent the disclosure from constituting a waiver of the privilege; it merely
obligates the recipient to comply with the terms of any confidentiality agreement"); In re Worlds of
Wonder Sec. Litig., 147 F.R.D. 208, 211-12 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that "[w]aiver of work-
product to the SEC also waives work-product to others," and that the company could "not pick and
choose to which adversaries [it would] reveal documents") (citations omitted).
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which courts have provided little, if any, guidance, is the scope of the waiver.
That is, to what extent does production of an otherwise-protected document
waive any protections as to other documents that were not produced?
Courts addressing selective waiver have been careful to distinguish
"selective" waiver from the issue of "partial" waiver, "where disclosure of a
part of a privileged document or set of such documents is argued to waive
privilege in the rest of it."' 10 4 As the Third Circuit explained in Westinghouse:
Although the rule in Diversified is often referred to as the
"limited waiver rule," we prefer not to use that phrase
because the word "limited" refers to two distinct types of
waivers: selective and partial. Selective waiver permits the
client who has disclosed privileged communications to one
party to continue asserting the privilege against other parties.
Partial waiver permits a client who has disclosed a portion of
privileged communications to continue asserting the privilege
as to the remaining portions of the same communications. 10'
But courts grappling with selective waiver generally have gone no further
than simply identifying the partial waiver issue. As the First Circuit noted in
United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology,10 6 "Nothing in this
opinion is intended to be directed to the different and difficult question when
disclosure of one document warrants forfeiture of protection for a different
but related document."
10 7
Indeed some courts have suggested that producing one privileged
document to the government may lead to waiver of protection for all materials
related to the same subject matter. For example, in In re Sealed Case, the
D.C. Circuit held that "[w]hen a party reveals part of a privileged
communication in order to gain an advantage in litigation, it waives the
privilege as to all other communications relating to the same subject
matter." 0 8 Likewise, in In re Martin Marietta Corp.,10 9 the Fourth Circuit
104. Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1997).
105. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1423 n.7.
106. 129 F.3d 681 (lst Cir. 1997).
107. Id. at 688; see also Dellwood Farms, 128 F.3d at 1127 ("Partial waiver is not in issue
here.").
108. 676 F.2d 793, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1982). According to the court, "'the privilege of secret
consultation is intended only as an incidental means of defense and not as an independent means of
attack, and to use it in the latter character is to abandon it in the former."' Id. (quoting 8 JOHN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2327 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961)).
109. 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988).
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found broad subject matter waiver pursuant to the "rule of implied waiver,"
under which "any disclosure of a confidential communication outside a
privileged relationship will waive the privilege as to all information related to
the same subject matter." 110
In re Martin Marietta involved a former employee of Martin Marietta,
William Pollard, who was under indictment for, among other things,
conspiring to defraud the Department of Defense ("DOD").11' Pollard
subpoenaed Martin Marietta for various documents, and the company
promptly moved to quash the subpoena. 112 Martin Marietta acknowledged
that portions of some documents it sought to withhold had been quoted in
disclosures the company made to the United States Attorney and the DOD." 3
Nevertheless, the company argued that the documents at issue were protected
from disclosure by either or both the attorney-client privilege and work-
product doctrine, and that a subpoena should be quashed when it calls for
privileged matter. 114 The Fourth Circuit court found that "[t]here can be no
dispute but that otherwise privileged materials were disclosed to the United
States Attorney and the DOD," and thus "[t]he issue is the extent of the
implied waiver thereby created.""15
As noted above, the implied waiver created by the disclosure was
expansive. The court held, for example, that a position paper submitted to the
United States Attorney arguing why Martin Marietta should not face
indictment, "as well as the underlying details," were "no longer within the
attorney-client privilege."116  In addition, "Martin Marietta [had] impliedly
waived the work-product privilege as to all non-opinion work-product on the
same subject matter as that disclosed." 17 The only limitation imposed by the
court related to opinion work-product, to which the concept of subject matter
waiver did not apply. 81 8 According to the court, "the underlying rationale for
110. Id. at623.
111. Id. at 620.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 621.
114. Id. at 622.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 623.
117. Id. at 625.
118. Id. at 626. The In re Martin Marietta court recognized that "the line between opinion and
non-opinion work-product can be a fine one." Id. As an example of the distinction, the court
indicated that transcripts of interviews conducted by counsel would be non-opinion work-product,
while an attorney's notations in the margins about litigation strategy would be opinion work-product.
Id. at 626 n.2; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings #5 Empanelled Jan. 28, 2004, 401 F.3d 247,
250 (4th Cir. 2005) ("Fact work-product... consists of documents prepared by an attorney that do
not contain the attorney's mental impressions," while "[o]pinion work-product ... contains[s] the
fruit of an attorney's mental processes.").
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the doctrine of subject matter waiver has little application in the context of a
pure expression of legal theory or legal opinion." 19 The court thus affirmed
the district court order requiring Martin Marietta to produce the documents
sought by subpoena, except for the documents over which Martin Marietta
claimed work-product protection; the district court was instructed to review
those documents in camera to determine whether they were opinion or non-
opinion work-product. 
120
While In re Martin Marietta was a criminal case that did not involve the
SEC, it does reveal the true depth and complexity of the selective waiver
issue. Quite simply, the fight between companies and third parties seeking
documents may extend beyond what a company produced to the Commission
in its effort to cooperate. That is, waiver as to one document may start a chain
reaction of waiver for related documents that were never produced to the
SEC. Thus, it is simply wrong to say that total waiver, rather than selective
waiver, creates "a reduction of uncertainty" for companies deciding whether
to produce privileged materials to the government. 21 There would be far
more transparency if a company knew that production of privileged materials
to the government waived only protections covering those documents and
only in relation to the one government entity that received those documents.
III. WHY SELECTIVE WAIVER IS PREFERABLE TO TOTAL WAIVER
The inability to quantify risk, to analyze the costs and benefits of
producing documents to the SEC, is antithetical to the proper functioning of a
market in general and a business in particular. Yet companies continue to
"cooperate" with government investigations. One might argue that this is
simply their choice, and that these companies must live with the repercussions
of their self-serving decision to aid investigations against them. But for men
and women facing the threat of imprisonment, the effective end of their
professional careers and financial well-being, and the weight of lining up
against the United States Government, it is not much of a choice. 1 22 In many
119. In re Martin Marietta, 856 F.2d at 626.
120. Id.
121. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 307 (6th Cir.
2002). Indeed, the Seaboard Report, for example, notes only that "in certain circumstances, the
Commission staff has agreed that a witness' production of privileged information would not
constitute a subject matter waiver that would entitle the staff to receive further privileged
information." Seaboard Report, supra note 1, at n.3 (citing Brief of SEC as Amicus Curiae,
McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 99-C-7980-3 (Ga. Ct. App. Filed May 13, 2001) (emphasis added).
And, of course, whatever the SEC's position is in a given case, that will not prevent third parties
from arguing in favor of the broadest subject matter waiver.
122. Indeed, Judge Boggs (now the Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit) was incorrect in his In re
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ways, cooperation must feel like the only option.
This coercion is relevant because "fairness" is at the heart of many
decisions that have rejected selective waiver. Courts have held that it is
simply unfair for a company to pick and choose when it can invoke the
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. But if courts are going
to view selective waiver through the prism of "fairness," the pressure that the
government places upon companies to waive their protections, which predates
any "selective" disclosure, is far more unfair. This, combined with
Congress's professed desire to prevent private fishing-expedition lawsuits
dependent on the fruits of discovery, justifies selective waiver.
A. Considerations of Fairness Justify Selective Waiver
Abstract notions of "fairness" have guided most of the courts that have
rejected selective waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work-product
protection. In Permian Corp. v. United States,123 for example, the first circuit
court opinion to reject the Eight Circuit's recognition of selective waiver, the
D.C. Circuit noted the following:
The client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his
opponents, waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting
the claim of confidentiality to obstruct others, or to invoke the
privilege as to communications whose confidentiality he has
already compromised for his own benefit.... The attorney-
client privilege is not designed for such tactical
employment. 
124
Columbia/HCA Healthcare dissent when he stated that "[r]ealistically speaking, the choice before
this court today is not between narrower and wider disclosure, but between a disclosure only to
government officials and no disclosure at all." In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 307 (Boggs, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). Companies have continued to disclose even where courts have found
that disclosure results in total waiver. See, e.g., In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d
Cir. 1993) ("The SEC has continued to receive voluntary cooperation from subjects of investigations,
notwithstanding the rejection of the selective waiver doctrine by two circuits and public statements
from Directors of the Enforcement Division that the SEC considers voluntary disclosures to be
discoverable and admissible."); In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 229 F.R.D. 636, 648 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
("[T]here is absolutely no evidence demonstrating that the disallowance of selective waiver would
impede the voluntary cooperation of a corporation with the Government.").
123. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
124. Id. at 1221 (emphasis added). The lone circuit to have rejected the fairness analysis in
relation to selective waiver is the Third Circuit. In Westinghouse, the court recognized that "[i]n
Permian and its progeny, the D.C. Circuit has taken the view that it is inherently unfair for a party to
selectively disclose privileged information in one proceeding but not another." Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1426 n.13 (3d Cir. 1991). The Westinghouse
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Echoing this reasoning, the Second Circuit would later hold in In re
Steinhardt that "selective assertion of privilege should not be merely another
brush on an attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or
strategic advantage."'' 25  The Sixth Circuit recently also held that "[l]ike
attorney-client privilege, there is no reason to transform the work-product
doctrine into another 'brush on the attorney's palette,' used as a sword rather
than a shield." 126 And the First Circuit has noted that "[f]airness is . . . a
concern where a client is permitted to choose to disclose materials to one
outsider while withholding them from another."1 27 These cases all embody
the view expressed by the D.C. Circuit in In re Sealed Case that privileged
documents need not be produced "unless an 'objective consideration' of
fairness requires disclosure to prevent undue manipulation of the
privilege."
12 8
But the nature of the SEC's current approach to cooperation suggests that
it is the government that is "manipulating" the privilege. The SEC is the one
coercing companies to waive their protections "or else." And it is the SEC
that is trying to link selective waiver to confidentiality agreements, which
would give the Commission even greater leverage over companies facing
penalties for non-cooperation. The true control, and thus the true tactical
employment, is being effected by the government, not the respective
companies it chooses to investigate.
Indeed, even if the Second Circuit and SEC were correct in In re
Steinhardt, and "cooperation" with the government continues even where
courts reject selective waiver,' 29 the attorney-client privilege still suffers.
Whether or not the company secures benefits from disclosing documents to
the government along the way, such a policy can dissuade employees from
discussing legal issues with counsel. 130 Quite simply, an employee will not
feel like he or she is speaking to an attorney in confidence when the substance
of that communication likely will be one of the first things that the
government, and then private plaintiffs, want to know. As a result, that
employee might feel, for example, that it simply is not worth putting his or her
court "hesitate[d] to rely on this rationale, however, for in our view, when a client discloses
privileged information to a government agency, the private litigant in subsequent proceedings is no
worse off than it would have been had the disclosure to the agency not occurred." Id.
125. In re Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 235.
126. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 307 (quoting In re Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 235).
127. United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 685 (lst Cir. 1997).
128. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2327 (John T. McNaughton rev. 1961)).
129. See In re Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236.
130. See Leonard Post, Eroding Privilege Hurts Corporate Compliance, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 15,
2005, at 6.
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name on an email that might prove to be the prime evidence against both the
employee and the company. 
131
The government's policy of pressuring companies to waive their attorney-
client and work-product protections is the real manipulation of the privilege.
In the days of the Voluntary Disclosure Program, the playing field was more
even; corporate disclosure was a more transparent decision before an SEC
investigation began. Now, however, the company already is a target facing
penalties for perceived non-cooperation (on top of whatever added sanctions
may be imposed in an enforcement action).
The SEC has no way to compel disclosure of privileged materials to aid
its investigation.132 But its approach to cooperation makes clear to companies
that things will go better for them if they agree to waive the attorney-client
and work-product protections. Thus, this is far more than a "difficult"
decision. 133  It is an unfair exploitation of power by the federal government
that has adverse effects on both the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine. Selective waiver therefore is justified. 134
131. See id. (quoting one general counsel's opinion that efforts by federal prosecutors to
pressure companies to waive the attomey-client privilege and work-product protection "'are having
the perverse opposite effect on our efforts to promote accountability and transparency,"' since
employees are .'not going to seek out their lawyer anymore when their lawyer could well become
Exhibit A for the prosecution').
132. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 311 (6th
Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("The only way that the government can obtain privileged
information is for the holder of the privilege voluntarily to disclose it.").
133. See In re Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236 ("Whether characterized as forcing a party in between a
Scylla and Charybdis, a rock and a hard place, or some other tired but equally evocative metaphoric
cliche, the 'Hobson's choice' argument is unpersuasive given the facts of this case. An allegation
that a party facing a federal investigation and the prospect of a civil fraud suit must make difficult
choices is insufficient justification for carving a substantial exception to the waiver doctrine.").
134. This Article does not address the impact of the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5
U.S.C. § 552 (2000), on the selective waiver issue. It has been argued that "even when a corporation
refuses an adverse party access to its voluntary SEC reports under the limited waiver rule, the SEC
may be obliged to disclose the same reports under the FOIA." Beth S. Dorris, Note, The Limited
Waiver Rule: Creation of an SEC-Corporation Privilege, 36 STAN. L. REV. 789, 807 (1984). Ms.
Dorris did acknowledge, however, that one of the exemptions to public access under FOIA applies to
matters that are "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4); see generally Dorris, supra, at 807-09, 809 n.93.
To the extent materials provided to the SEC remain otherwise privileged or confidential, this
exemption should apply.
In addition, FOIA provides an exemption for disclosure of "records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes," where such production "could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7), (7)(A). In her widely-cited note, Ms. Dorris
suggested that this exemption would not apply in the selective waiver context because "it is not clear
the reports submitted under the voluntary disclosure program are 'investigatory records,' since the
voluntary reports [submitted under the voluntary disclosure program] are not the product of an
agency investigation." Dorris, supra, at 810. She added: "Nor is it clear that they are 'compiled for
law enforcement purposes,' since the SEC promises not to bring an enforcement action against the
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B. Congress's Intent in Enacting the PSLRA Also Justifies Selective Waiver
If disclosure to the government waives the attorney-client privilege and
work-product protection as to third parties, then third parties have an incentive
to file suit against the company and to obtain those sensitive materials through
discovery. Private litigants have greater reason to sue because they will see,
or at least hope to see, the results of attorney-led internal investigations into
wrongdoing and potentially incriminating documents that otherwise would
have been withheld. This is the type of fishing expedition through discovery
that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 19951 35 was designed to
stop.
1. Background of the PSLRA
The PSLRA was enacted "to deter strike suits wherein opportunistic
private plaintiffs file securities fraud claims of dubious merit in order to exact
large settlement recoveries."'' 36 To do this, the legislation placed "stringent
procedural requirements" on plaintiffs who pursue private securities fraud
claims.137  These include the pleading requirement that the plaintiff in a
private securities fraud suit "state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."'
' 38
In addition, the plaintiff must "specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and
belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief
is formed."'
139
The PSLRA also added identical provisions to the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that created a "discovery stay."
'140
Section 21D(b)(3)(B) of the PSLRA provides that "in any private action
arising under this chapter, all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed
during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the court finds upon the
participating corporation." Id. Again, this analysis is rooted in the unique nature of the SEC's
Voluntary Disclosure Program. Now, where production of privileged documents to the SEC
generally is in furtherance of a government investigation, and not in place of one, a producing
company likely could invoke this exemption to prevent public disclosure under FOIA.
135. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
136. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2000).
137. Id.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).
139. § 78u-4(b)(1).
140. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B); see § 77z-l(b)(1).
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motion of any party that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve
evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party." 141
Federal district courts have noted two reasons for this discovery stay: (1)
to prevent private plaintiffs from using the high cost of discovery as leverage
to induce settlement and (2) to prevent fishing-expedition lawsuits dependent
on the fruits of discovery rather than the allegations contained in the
complaint. 142 As one district court noted:
The legislative history of the PSLRA indicates that Congress
enacted the discovery stay to prevent plaintiffs from filing
securities class actions with the intent of using the discovery
process to force a coercive settlement. Congress also enacted
the mandatory stay of discovery to prevent plaintiffs from
filing securities fraud lawsuits as a vehicle in order to conduct
discovery in the hopes of finding a sustainable claim[] not
alleged in the complaint. 143
The first reason for a discovery stay described in the legislative history,
relating to the cost of discovery, does not seem applicable in the context of
documents already produced to the government. According to the House
conference report, "[t]he cost of discovery often forces innocent parties to
settle frivolous securities class actions."' 144 But where documents already
have been reviewed and compiled for production, producing them again
would require little additional cost or effort. 1
45
The second reason for the discovery stay, that is, to prevent fishing-
expedition lawsuits, is much more relevant to the selective waiver issue. The
PSLRA was designed in part "to deter the 'abusive practices committed in
private securities litigation,' which includes 'the routine filing of lawsuits...
with only faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some
plausible cause of action."' ' 146  As the Ninth Circuit held in Medhekar v.
141. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B); see § 77z-l(b)(1).
142. See, e.g., In re Labranche Sec. Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 178, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing
cases).
143. Id. (citations and quotations omitted); see generally S. REP. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995), as
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 693 (discussing purpose ofPSLRA); H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at
31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 748 (discussing purpose of PSLRA).
144. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31.
145. See, e.g., Singer v. Nicor, Inc., No. 02-C-5168, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26189, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 24, 2003) (noting that since documents produced to the government "have already been
found and compiled, and plaintiffs will pay the production costs, defendants would not be unduly
burdened by producing them to plaintiffs now").
146. Faulkner v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 384, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting
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United States District Court, 147 "Congress clearly intended that complaints in
these securities actions should stand or fall based on the actual knowledge of
the plaintiffs rather than information produced by the defendants after the
action has been filed."' 48  But if plaintiffs know they can obtain attorney-
client communications and attorney work-product through discovery, they
have all the more reason to sue and to rely on this sensitive information to
bolster, if not define, their allegations. Thus, a rejection of selective waiver
creates incentives that directly conflict with a main purpose of the PSLRA. 1
49
2. Lifting the Discovery Stay Because of Production to the Government
This incentive to sue is heightened where courts lift the discovery stay to
permit access to materials previously produced to the government. Cases
addressing the PSLRA discovery stay are even less consistent than those
addressing selective waiver, but the apparent trend is for courts to lift the
discovery stay in such circumstances. As a threshold matter, this approach
creates an unacceptable incentive for civil litigants to sue in hope that they
will obtain relevant unprotected documents in the early stages of the case that
were cherry-picked as part of a government investigation. It also threatens to
streamline the delivery of once-privileged documents to private plaintiffs and
141 CONG. REC. H13699 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995) (statement of House Managers)); see also id.
(stating that "testimony before the Senate from corporate executives included the following
statement: 'once the suit is filed, the plaintiff's law firm proceeds to search through all of the
company's documents and take endless depositions for the slightest positive comment which they
can claim induced the plaintiff to invest and any shred of evidence that the company knew a
downturn was coming"') (quoting S. REP. No. 104-98, at 14) (citations omitted).
147. 99 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1996).
148. Id. at 328.
149. In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir.
1991), the Third Circuit noted that "the SEC unsuccessfully sought to have the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 amended to include a specific provision establishing a selective waiver rule
protecting corporate disclosures to the agency." Id. at 1427 (citing SEC Statement in Support of
Proposed § 24(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 in 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. at 461 (Mar.
2, 1984)). Similarly, in 2003, the Securities Fraud and Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of
2003 was introduced in the House of Representatives and supported by the SEC. See generally
Testimony Concerning the Securities Fraud Deterrence & Investor Restitution Act: Hearing on H.R.
2179 Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored
Enterprises (2003) (statement of Stephen Cutler, SEC Dir., Div. of Enforcement). Section 4 of the
proposed legislation would have created selective waiver, rather than total waiver, of the attorney-
client privilege and work-product protection for materials produced pursuant to a written
confidentiality agreement between the SEC and the producing party. Securities Fraud Deterrence &
Investor Restitution Act, H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003). Like the 1984 proposed legislation, the
2003 bill was never signed into law, yet this provides no meaningful evidence of Congress's position
on the merits of one provision in the much larger bill. See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1427 n.15
("We do not infer an intention to prohibit the selective waiver rule from Congress's inaction.").
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to even further disadvantage companies that "cooperated" with government
investigations.
The true impact of case law lifting the discovery stay is unclear, however,
because to this point courts generally have not grappled with the selective
waiver issue in relation to the stay. In fact, two district courts in the Fourth
Circuit have lifted the stay, but suggested that "privileged" information was
exempt from disclosure to the plaintiffs. 150 This appears to be in stark
contrast with the Fourth Circuit's holding in In re Martin Marietta Corp.,
which reiterated the "rule of implied waiver" under which "any disclosure of a
confidential communication outside a privileged relationship will waive the
privilege as to all information related to the same subject matter." 151
As noted above, the discovery stay may be lifted only if the court finds
"that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent
undue prejudice to that party."'15 2  Unless there is a risk that evidence
somehow will be lost due to delay, 153 the principal issue seems to be what
constitutes "undue prejudice." Once again, "fairness" is a major part of the
analysis, since "district courts here and elsewhere have construed 'undue
prejudice' to mean improper or unfair treatment amounting to something less
than irreparable harm." 
54
But courts differ in their determination of what constitutes unfair
treatment. Some courts have refused to lift the discovery stay even though the
documents sought by the plaintiffs were produced to government agencies.' 55
150. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., MDL-15863, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3469 (D. Md. Mar. 7,
2005); In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 220 F.R.D. 246 (D. Md. 2004).
151. 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988).
152. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
153. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., 381 F. Supp. 2d 129, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
("Plaintiffs contend that the partial lift on the stay of discovery is necessary because defendants are
liquidating certain subsidiaries or affiliates of the Vivendi corporation, and there is a risk that
documents may be lost with the transfer of control over portions of defendants' business."); cf H.R.
REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 748 (citing as
an example of when discovery may be necessary, "where the terminal illness of an important witness
might require the deposition of the witness prior to the ruling on the motion to dismiss").
154. In re Vivendi Universal, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 130 (quotations omitted); see also In re CFS-
Related Sec. Fraud Litig., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1265 (N.D. Okla. 2001) ("'Undue' prejudice is
prejudice that is improper or unfair under the circumstances.").
155. In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & "ERISA" Litig., MDL No. 1500, 02 Civ. 5575
(SWK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12846, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2003) ("Lead Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that exceptional circumstances are present in this case requiring production of
documents previously produced to various government agencies, and the application to lift the
PSLRA automatic stay of discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss is therefore
denied."); Rampersad v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 131, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(denying motion to lift stay and noting that while "Plaintiff contends that the PSLRA stay of
discovery does not apply when the information sought has already been provided to a governmental
agency," the plaintiff had "cited no authority for such a categorical exception to the PSLRA's
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By contrast, a slight majority of the cases addressing the issue and several of
the more recent cases have held that the stay must be lifted. According to
these courts, allowing the government to have materials produced by the
defendant while preventing private plaintiffs from having the same
information puts the plaintiffs at an unfair disadvantage. 156 As one court held:
In balancing the purpose of the PSLRA stay, the detriment to
Defendant, the burden production would impose on
Defendant, the detriment to Lead Plaintiff, and general
principles of fairness, the Court finds that it would be unfair
and unnecessary, and hence "undue," to require Lead Plaintiff
to suffer any prejudice as a result of the PSLRA stay as
regards the information already produced to investigating
governmental bodies. 1
57
If production to the government can be a basis for lifting the PSLRA
discovery stay, then the leverage plaintiffs' lawyers can exert over companies
in search of a profitable settlement, and thus the incentive to sue, grows
exponentially. This result is in clear conflict with the purpose of the PSLRA.
discovery stay provision"); In re Vivendi Universal, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 130-31 (denying motion to
lift stay and noting that "I find no evidence that plaintiffs face the same prospect, as in Worldcom...,
that they would be left without a remedy in light of settlement discussions or other intervening
events, such as bankruptcy or attempt to take control over plaintiff by acquisition").
156. See, e.g., Seippel v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood LLP, 03 Civ. 6942 (SAS), 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2388, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2005) (noting that court lifted stay as to documents
produced to government because "[t]hese governmental investigations and lawsuits are ongoing, and
the Seippels will be prejudiced if they lack access to documents which have been produced to
others"); In re Labranche Sec. Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (lifting stay because
"the SEC and NYSE investigated and are continuing to investigate the precise schemes alleged by
Lead Plaintiffs in the Complaint," and "[i]f the stay remains in place, Lead Plaintiffs will be the only
interested party without access to those documents and will be prejudiced by their inability to make
informed decisions about their litigation strategy in this rapidly shifting landscape"); Singer v. Nicor,
Inc., No. 02-C-5168, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26189, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2003) (lifting stay
because "Plaintiffs here may well be unfairly disadvantaged if they do not have access to the
documents that the governmental and other agencies already have, during the pendency of the motion
to dismiss"); In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 234 F. Supp. 2d 301, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (lifting stay
because "[w]ithout access to documents already made available to the U.S. Attorney, the SEC, [and
others] NYSCRF would be prejudiced by its inability to make informed decisions about its litigation
strategy in a rapidly shifting landscape."); In re Enron Sec. Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., MDL-1446
et al., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26261, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2002) (lifting stay as to materials
already made available to numerous government agencies and others).
157. In re Williams Sec. Litig., No. 02-CV-72H (M), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24304, at *17
(N.D. Okla. May 22, 2003).
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3. The Battle to Come: Reconciling Waiver with Lifting the PSLRA
Discovery Stay
Curiously, none of the decisions lifting the discovery stay for documents
produced to the government actually grapples with the selective waiver issue.
Presumably, some of the materials produced to the government, and sought by
the plaintiffs, once were subject to the attorney-client privilege and work-
product protection. Yet most courts deciding whether to lift the stay and
make these materials available to plaintiffs have not addressed whether
private plaintiffs also should have access to the privileged documents.
Indeed, none of these cases from the Southern District of New York has even
cited, let alone discussed, the impact of the Second Circuit's decision in In re
Steinhardt Partners, L.P., which suggested that selective waiver of work-
product protection might exist only if there was a confidentiality
agreement. 1
58
In fact, two recent decisions from the District of Maryland apparently
failed to consider the Fourth Circuit's holding in In re Martin Marietta Corp.,
which imposed a broad subject matter waiver of the attorney-client privilege
and non-opinion work-product after materials were produced to the
government. In In re Royal Ahold N. V. Securities & ERISA Litigation,
159
private plaintiffs "requested permission to seek discovery of materials
produced in connection with various external investigations of the defendants'
alleged misconduct, as well as reports generated by the defendants' internal
investigations."' 160 In addition to the opposition filed by the defendants, the
"United States government ... intervened in the case and moved to prevent
discovery of the investigative reports."' 16' Nevertheless, the district court
granted the plaintiffs' motion "to the extent necessary to allow discovery of
materials previously produced to outside agencies."' 62 As part of its holding,
however, the court "recognize[d] that the defendants may need to review the
documents for privilege."' 163 Under Martin Marietta, such a review would
seem unnecessary, since there would have been waiver as to all documents
produced to the government. 164
158. 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993).
159. 220 F.R.D. 246 (D. Md. 2004).
160. Id. at 247.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 248.
163. Id. at 250 n.l.
164. Indeed, several months after it agreed to lift the discovery stay, the Royal Ahold district
court addressed In re Martin Marietta's selective waiver holding for the first time when it granted
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Likewise, in In re Mutual Funds Investment Litigation,165 the court gave
mixed signals regarding whether production to the government created
waiver. On the one hand, the court lifted the PSLRA discovery stay and held
that "[d]efendants should now produce to plaintiffs . . . all documents they
have provided to the SEC that the SEC has identified for use as exhibits
during administrative depositions of Fund personnel." 166  There was no
indication that this production could be limited by the attorney-client privilege
or work-product protection. On the other hand, the court also ordered that
"[d]efendants should now produce to plaintiffs all documents constituting or
reflecting communications between them and regulatory agencies with regard
to market timing or late trading."' 167  As to this production, as well as the
production of materials pursuant to requests that did not involve documents
produced to the government, the court noted the following:
A defendant may decline to produce particular documents...
on the ground of privilege or confidentiality but shall provide
to plaintiffs a log of all such documents. After conferring
with the defendant, plaintiffs may move to compel any
document they believe is being improperly withheld on the
ground of privilege or confidentiality. 
168
Again, under In re Martin Marietta, the attorney-client privilege and
work-product protection would not seem to apply to documents previously
produced to government agencies.
Waiver would not necessarily be the preferable course, but it is
noteworthy that these decisions and others addressing the PSLRA discovery
stay do not discuss selective waiver jurisprudence. As more courts consider
whether production to the government should result in a lift of the discovery
stay, this issue is likely to come to the forefront. Plaintiffs will invariably
make a point of obtaining documents that the company seeks to withhold as
plaintiffs' motion to compel ostensibly privileged materials that had been produced to the DOJ and
SEC. In re Royal Ahold N.V. Secs. & ERISA Litig., 230 F.R.D. 433, 437-38 (D. Md. 2005). The
court offered several bases for granting plaintiffs' motion, including that the subject matter of the
contested materials was publicly disclosed in securities filings and other productions to the plaintiffs
and that Royal Ahold's confidentiality agreements with the government agencies gave those agencies
discretion to disclose the materials. Id. at 437. Consequently, the court held that "Royal Ahold has
not taken steps to preserve the confidentiality of its opinion work-product sufficient to protect the
interview memoranda it already has disclosed to the government." Id. at 438.
165. MDL-15863, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3469 (D. Md. Mar. 7, 2005).
166. Id. at *34.
167. Id. at *4.
168. Id. at *3 n.2.
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privileged or confidential. This will force courts to look again at the selective
waiver issue and to weigh whether it is fair for plaintiffs' lawyers to
piggyback on government investigations to improve their chances of
obtaining a lucrative settlement at the expense of the company's existing
shareholders.
IV. CONCLUSION
All things being equal, a company should not be able to waive privilege as
to some and then invoke it as to others. But things are not equal. Today's
circumstances are very different from the days of the SEC's Voluntary
Disclosure Program, though courts rejecting selective waiver have not
recognized this change. The federal government, in particular the SEC, is at
least implicitly pressuring companies to waive the attorney-client privilege
and work-product protection. The remarkably unsettled caselaw makes it
impossible for a company to know exactly what it risks by producing
materials to the government, yet it "cooperates" anyway and thereby erodes
employees' willingness to consult with their counsel. This is not a business
decision; it is a corporate reaction to an abuse of government power. And
since fairness is the touchstone of the courts' analysis, selective waiver is both
justifiable and necessary.
Courts like the Ninth Circuit that have not yet addressed selective waiver
and courts that will face it again in the context of the PSLRA discovery stay
should recognize that selective waiver will limit both the government's ability
to manipulate the privilege and plaintiffs' lawyers' incentive to sue first and
discover claims later. These courts should reverse the current trend and
embrace the concept of selective waiver. But to ensure a fair and uniform
result in all federal jurisdictions, Congress must enact legislation that will
limit the effects of disclosure in government investigations and thus foster
true cooperation between government and business.
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